When senior leaders re-organized and over-emphasized reporting which supported their biases, analysis and reporting fell in step. MacArthur’s decision to invade North Korea led to the third phase of the war—the Chinese decision to commit forces into the conflict. By dividing the labor within Defense Intelligence, we have given an increased voice to Command Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs/JAC) and allowed the Service intelligence production organizations to speak virtually for the country on many matters of interest to their particular Service. , Shortly before the North’s attack, U.S. SIGINT identified at least six of the nine Chinese armies relocating to Manchuria in preparation for crossing the Yalu River, but U.S. decision makers downplayed the reports. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us. Or, you can send us a message using the Tor browser at ciadotgov4sjwlzihbbgxnqg3xiyrg7so2r2o3lt5wz5ypk4sxyjstad.onion. Adobe Acrobat Pro 10.1.3; modified using iText 5.0.4 (c) 1T3XT BVBA With the possible--and increasingly less likely--exception of North Korea, however, the direct major military threats to United States national security interests will be virtually nonexistent for the rest of the decade. We are far ahead of any other institution in the world in terms of the ability to collect sensitive information. And the notion that we can "simply" use technology to fuse work being done at disparate locations is an idea held by those who have never been analysts. Please check our site map, search feature, or our site navigation on the left The 111th Signal Service Company was in Korea up until July 1948 collecting on Soviets located directly across the 38th Parallel. First, in each instance they respond directly to a higher authority that has an agenda, one that may involve a competition for forces in the case of a Command, or funding for weapon systems and force structure in the case of the Services. Check in with the person to make sure you’re understood. Operation Trudy Jackson, a joint CIA-Navy operation, prepared the environment for the invasion. U.S., ROK, and U.N. forces drove a demoralized and unsupplied North Korean army nearly back to the Chinese border. Such a regimen would re-establish a true Community in which agencies would have a legitimate basis upon which to debate analytic positions.
Reporting pipelines for transferring tactical reports and field interrogation notes from line units to rear area interrogators were often slow or non-existent. communication issues, the CIA Recruitment Center does not accept resumes, nor can we return
The result was not one, but two blindsides in Korea to begin the Cold War. Organizationally, we are not set up to cull critical facts and fuse them into analytic products that respond directly to our consumers' needs. Finally, a robust and responsive tactical intelligence capability is necessary to hold the line when higher analysis and leaders make mistakes. Depending on what you provide, we may offer you compensation.
4 0 obj Nonetheless, we are operating on borrowed time, living off residual expertise, and not recapitalizing. Formally chartering a "Team B" concept to play devil's advocate would also be a worthwhile investment.
Despite their limited numbers and capabilities, especially at the beginning of the conflict, on-the-ground intelligence assets on the Korean Peninsula provided usable information to supported commanders. For example, the US 7th Fleet had only one intelligence officer in the Far East Command and massive manpower increases were required to fill the required staff positions. The reductions in personnel and funding led to increased competition between the Army, Navy, and Air Force cryptologic agencies. But, if we are going to invest in all of the overhead associated with having an IC, then make use of it. That said, CIA will not do the kind of detailed order-of-battle analysis that should be the province of the Defense intelligence community. Strong evidence exists showing that senior military leaders, including General Willoughby, were involved in these activities. As for classic military threats, regional actors will have limited capabilities that could impact on US concerns: Iran in the Persian Gulf, China on its periphery, perhaps Russia against an expanded NATO, and so forth. Certainly, there need to be some threshold decisions, including the extent of our role in economic or environmental intelligence. And, as had been true of virtually all previous intelligence failures, collection was not the issue. Adobe Acrobat Pro 10.1.3 In almost everything we do, there are aspects we could have done better. In the transition period for any major IC consolidation, we would lose effectiveness for a substantial time and would be operating for years at less than optimal performance, potentially. The ‘A’ list consisted of 20 requirements, one of which involved North Korea: “Soviet activities in North Korea”. Office of Public Affairs
The entire intelligence command structure in Asia was severely degraded at the outbreak of the war. The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This alone suggests that we should concentrate first on Defense intelligence production consolidation--and only then go on to further reorganization. Interagency Competition and Personalities.
Despite these optimistic trends, other threats will prove to be very real in the first decade of the 21st century. In this article, we’ll detail how to avoid miscommunication in the workplace.
 Alexander Ovedenko, “(Mis)interpreting Threats: A Case Study of the Korean War,” Security Studies, Vol 16, Issue 2.  On many occasions, POWs with valuable tactical intelligence were seized by units who did not report their existence to senior interrogators for extended periods of time. Somewhere in this process, the corporate needs of the country have gotten lost in the shuffle. (10) This would require a legislative change to Title 10, which the Services have used to justify a production element as part of their man, train, and equip functions. By putting one person in charge and getting rid of all the problems associated with the division of labor, we would create an organization that could do true fusion analysis. Major General Willoughby, General MacArthur’s Far East Command senior intelligence officer, had only minimal personnel available. Learn more about Career Opportunities at CIA. A large fusion center in Washington would consist of regional, transnational, infrastructure, and technical components, with separate regional elements that address current (J2), basic, and longer term estimative work (a robust staffing of regional offices would ensure proper warfighter support by maintaining a ready pool of experts available for crisis task forces). endobj (9) I will not actually address State/INR, but this organization shows what can be done with a small number of high-quality people. In addition to the options below, individuals contact CIA in a variety of creative ways. While policy-makers in Washington analyzed less-than-accurate information from MacArthur’s intelligence services, accurate and timely tactical intelligence helped win battles in Korea that were necessary to provide time for strategic plans to develop. %���� 1 0 obj Please note we have no control over the security and reliability of postal mail. This artificial distinction has never existed in history, but the IC is going to be expected to operate under such a regimen and do high-quality analysis. Repatriated POW Capt. We just need to manage the IC a little better. However, many POWs had ample access to tactical information that was improperly or under-exploited. Independent military service intelligence production organizations at the national level should be eliminated--merged with DIA--and a single organization subordinate to Office of the Secretary of Defense should be established.(10). The Community will try to explain the failure(s) away, and it will legitimately point to extenuating circumstances. But we are going to begin making more and bigger mistakes more often. However, while much of this analysis provided indicators and warnings that an invasion was possible, it disregarded the invasion due to the commonly held belief by decision makers that the Soviet Union controlled North Korea’s decisions. Generally speaking, fewer analysts have less time to read more traffic and still fewer can keep up with their part of an increasingly complicated world; analysts have little opportunity for reflection, much less longer term research (2). If we do opt to maintain a Community, it will mean that we have accepted significant amounts of overlap.